Surely there's a better argument
I disagree with you. First, the court in Lawrence v. Texas mentioned the case of Dudgeon v. UK because the proscribed conduct held invalid by the European Convention on Human Rights was based somewhat upon English common law. In case you are unaware, many of the laws in the US are based upon the old common law as well.As you can see, the case is long on theory and short on evidence. You'd think they'd come up with a better argument. However, we've now got about 210 years' worth of practical experience against which this theory can be compared.
Second, it is the job of the courts to interpret and administer laws. It is also the power of the judiciary to hear ALL caes arising under the Constitution. (See Art. III). Thus, when you have a statute that deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and denies the individual the equal protection of the laws (see Amend. 14) then you have an issue that should be decided by the court... not the Texas Legislature.
Finally, lifetime tenure for article III judges serves us very well. The reason behind granting certain judges lifetime tenure is to allow them to uphold the Constitution ... rather than forcing them to try and please whoever will be voting to re-elect them. If they must "politick" in order to be re-elected, they will not care as much about preserving the Constituion, instead they will do everything in their power to be re-elected, regardless if the activity is proscribed by the Constitution. In short, you are wrong.
The theory holds that if judges are subject to election, their judging will veer away from a constitutional base and toward simple majoritarianism. Judges, the theory goes, should be insulated from political pressure.
It's just as easy to argue -- and actually much easier to document -- the ways in which lifetime tenure allows judges to depart freely from the constitution and make law from the bench. And it's much easier to show that elections impose boundaries beyond which judges wander at their peril.
There are any number of examples of Supreme Court decisions to illustrate the former condition: on legislative districts, religion, privacy, campaign finance, the death penalty, defendants' rights, the Commerce Clause, you name it. In the latter, exhibit A is former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird. She, like many federal judges over the last 50 years, believed the death penalty to be wrong, despite what the state constitution said. So she voted to overturn every death sentence she was asked to consider.
In theory, if a federal judge behaved that way, there's an existing consitutional remedy: impeachment. But in the last century, this remedy has not been applied except in cases of corruption. Bad judging (like this, for example) is something U.S. citizens are asked to accept as the price of an independent judiciary -- a benefit of nebulous value.
California citizens, on the other hand (and those in all but three New England states) do have a remedy. Every six or eight or 10 years, they, or their elected representatives, get to do performance evaluations. In Rose Bird's case, it was a retention election. She lost, and rightly so.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, it's expected, will soon step down. About his replacement we will know nothing beyond his existing written decisions. Judicial ethics require him not to comment on cases before the court or those that might come before the court. It's a crapshoot, and we're as likely to be disappointed over the long term with the judge's performance as we are to be satisfied. Eisenhower said he made two mistakes in office, and they were both on the Supreme Court. Reagan put Scalia on the court, but he's also responsible for second-stringer Anthony Kennedy. GHW Bush named Thomas but also the unfortunate David Souter -- about whom, by the way, so little was known that even at the time of his nomination he was regarded as something of a mystery.
I'm not going fisk the post above, but I'll leave it at this: Either the Lawrence court amended the Constitution from the bench, repealing the states' authority to make their own laws, or the Bowers court, overturned by Lawrence a scant 15 years later, violated the defendants' constitutional rights. One set of judges or the other, in any other line of work, would be subject to sanctions of some sort.
